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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of individual unemployment experiences on
re−employment wages. The empirical analysis is carried out on a panel of Italian individuals.
The main result is that while in the northern regions the effect is similar to the one estimated
for the UK, in the southern area of the country the impact is not significant. We link this
result to the particular socio−economic environment in which the unemployment spells are
experienced. We argue that this might be due to the fact that in a high unemployment
environment individual unemployment experiences are perceived as "normal" and do not
necessarily signal poor quality of the worker. This might have effects in inducing the
hysteresis of unemployment, and reducing the downward pressure of unemployment on
wages at the macro level.
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The effect of unemployment experience on subsequent pay and employment opportunities is a




The original idea is that prolonged spells of unemployment involve loss of skill, decrease
future pay, lower the probability of finding a new job, and increase the chance of entering an
unstable, low paid occupation. The existing evidence suggests that these effects are relevant
and call for appropriate policy actions in order to avoid the costs of unemployment . At the
same time, empirical evidence points out that the consequences of unemployment experience
are higher for prime age, male, skilled individuals and may be exacerbated in a more flexi-
ble institutional framework. It appears, for example, that in the US the loss in term of wages
and employment opportunities is larger than in European countries (Gregory and Jukes, 2001).
However, inEuropeitisnottheexperiencebutthedurationofunemploymentthatreallyimplies
a penalty.
In this paper we present evidence on the extent of unemployment scarring in Italy. We argue
that this effect is lower in those regions where the experience of unemployment is considered
partofthetypicalindividual’slabormarkethistoryandunemploymentspellsarenotnecessarily
perceived as a signal of low productivity. Also, the depressing effect of individual unemploy-
ment spells onwages tends tobelowerifthelaborforce is less trainedandthere is a limitedloss
of specific human capital. We argue that the socio-economic environment and the institutional
set-up, including the wage bargaining mechanism, are key variables in shaping the effects of
the unemployment experience on individual’s employment and wage prospects. This is not to
understate the cost of unemployment but to underline that the characterization of appropriate
employment policies should be related to ’’the diversity of harms done by unemployment [...]
ratherthansimplyataddingtothenumberofpeoplewhocouldbecountedasbeingemployed’’.
(Sen,1997,p. 22). Thereducedimpactofunemploymentonwagesatmicro-levelmightexplain
the small sensitivity of wages to unemployment observed in aggregate regional estimates and
the difficulty of estimating a Phillips curve and finding a NAIRU for Italian southern regions
(Brunello HW DO, 2000). As pointed out in leading papers in the field,(Blanchard and Summers,
1988) the social behavior associated to high rates of unemployment may be one of the causes
of unemployment persistence and hysteresis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of the theoretical expla-
nations of unemployment scarring, Section 3resumes the Italianexperience. Section4 contains
the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
 7KHRUHWLFDO H[SODQDWLRQV RI XQHPSOR\PHQW VFDUULQJ
The theoretical literature identifies various sources of scarring. Human capital theory sees un-
employment associated to the permanent loss of firm-specific human capital and as a source
of deterioration of general skill (Pissarides, 1992). The theory of signals also offers an expla-
nation of why unemployment may induce lower wages in future occupations (Belzil, 1995). If
productivity is imperfectly observable the employer may take a past history of unemployment
￿
See, for example, a recent issue of the Economic Journal (November 2001) dedicated to this topic.
1as a signal for lower productivity. An opposite result may arise if we consider job matching
theories. Unemployment spells may involve the placement of workers into jobs characterized
by high productivity and pay (Altonji and Sakoto, 1987; Mortensen, 1988; Topel, 1991).
Although some of the empirical implications of these theories may be different, they all
predict that the effects of unemployment spells are larger for more skilled, high educated and
trained workers. These individuals are likely to suffer from larger human capital deterioration.
At the same time, the stigma effect in an imperfect information environment might be more
relevant for skilled individuals. Also, the quality of the match could influence substantially the
wageprospectsoftheemployedinhighlyspecializedactivities. Anotherrelevantissueconcerns
the socio–economic setting where the unemployment experience is undertaken. According to
the mentioned theories, the lack of information on the real worker’s productivity may cause a
huge impact of the individual’s past unemployment history on subsequent pay and employment
probabilities. However, the more widespread the status of unemployment, the less informative
(and stigmatizing) it is in order to detect the real worker’s characteristics. As a consequence,
joblessness is perceived as less costly where the rate of unemployment is very high.
The institutional framework and, in particular, the bargaining mechanism may influence the
effect of unemployment on wages. In the presence of full coverage of union negotiations, the
wage structure may be rigid and the wage losses after unemployment spells reduced.
 7KH ,WDOLDQ H[SHULHQFH
ItiswellknownthatthegeographicalmismatchisinItalyextremelyhigh. Figure1describesthe
rate of unemployment in four Italian geographical areas and makes it clear that unemployment
is mainly a disease of the South.
Thereexistsalsoevidenceofsignificantdivergenceofregionalunemploymentratesinrecent
years (Brunello HW DO, 2001a).
The Northern and Southern areas of the country differ not only in terms of labor market
conditions but, in general, the Southern regions present the characteristics of a less developed
area with respect to industrial composition and regional GDP growth (Brunello HW DO., 2001a).
We also know that the informal economy is widely diffused in the South of the country and that
it represents an escape route to tax payments, bargained tariff wages, and hiring and firing legal
restrictions. The wage bargaining mechanism inItaly is basedon a two-stage wage setting. The
first stage of the bargaining takes place at industry level and leads to minimum tariff wages
which apply to all workers in the industry. Second stage firm level bargaining may also occur
involving wage drift settelements. It has been shown that the second stage of the bargaining
is more widespread in the big companies localized in the North of the country (Corneo and
Lucifora, 1997); thisfactaddssomeflexibilitytowagesettinginthis geographicalarea. Hence,
in this respect even institutional aspects may differ in the two areas.
 (PSLULFDO 5HVXOWV
The data are derived from the Bank of Italy Survey of Italian Households Income and Wealth
(SHIW) for the years 1993 and 1995. The most recent available data from the same survey
(1998) do not include variables that are essential for the present analysis.
We first select a panel of individuals that participated to both the waves of the survey. The
2Figure 1: Unemployment rates in four Italian macro-regions.
3Table 1: independent variables
Name Description Name Description
age age notmarr not married
exper age - age at first job div_wid divorced / widow(er)
exper2 exper
￿
csize2 20,000-40,000 inh. town
tenure age - age at present job csize3 40,000-500,000 inh. town
tenure2 tenure
￿
csize4 :500.000 inh. town
lom ... sar regional dummies educ2 middle school
qual2 office worker educ3 prof. secondary school dip.
qual4 junior manager / cadre educ4 high school
qual5 manager / senior official educ5 university degree
sect2 industry (excl. constr.) sick days of sickness in the year
sect3 building and construction mainjob main job
sect4 trade fsize2 firm size: 20-49 employees
sect5 transport & communic. fsize3 50-99 employees
sect6 credit & insurance fsize4 100-499 employees
sect7 real estate & renting services fsize5  Dff employees
sect8 domestic services u_south un. experience * south
fampos2 spouse / partner u_north un. experience * north
fampos3 son / daughter Constant constant term
fampos4 other relative
number of individuals is further restricted on the basis of apparent inconsistencies among the
answers given by he same individuals in the two waves. Since we want to estimate the effect on
wages of a significant unemployment spell, we then consider only those individuals that were
employed in the private sector in 1993 and did not have important unemployment experiences
up to that date. We do not consider individuals working in the public sector, given that civil
servants’ wages are much less flexible than those of private employees. Finally, we consider
the same individuals in 1995, having also information about their unemployment experiences
in the period 1993-1995. The final panel is constituted of 1112 individuals observed over the
1993 and the 1995 survey waves.
The crucial variable is a dummy that signals if the individual experienced an unemployment
spell of DW OHDVW six months.
2 The wage variable is an estimate of the real (log-)hourly wage at
1995prices: thisisobtainedbyconsideringtheannualwage, thenumberofmonthsworked, and
theaveragenumberofhoursperweek. Theimplicitnationalaccountshouseholds’ consumption
deflator (ESA 1995, at 1995 prices) is used to obtain constant-prices estimates for the 1993
wages.
In order to estimate the effect of unemployment experiences on re-employment wages, we
￿
The survey question reads as follows: ’’Has (name of the family component) ever lost a job at any time in
his/her life and remained unemployed for at least 6 consecutive months? (N.B. not when a first-job seeker)’’.
Unfortunately, the data included in SHIW do not contain information about the exact individual unemployment
spells duration and the precise dating of unemployment experiences. Since we select people that were employed
in 1993 and did answer ’’no’’ to a similar question at that date, we consider the answer to be referred to the period
1993-1995.
4Table 2: Estimated coefficients
Variable Coefficient (t-prob) Variable Coefficient (t-prob)
age 0.0054 (0.006) notmarr -0.1226 (0.001)
exper 0.0132 (0.000) div_wid -0.1066 (0.026)
exper2 -0.0003 (0.000) csize2 0.0527 (0.028)
tenure 0.0006 (0.811) csize3 0.0265 (0.216)
tenure2 1.5e-5 (0.806) csize4 0.0296 (0.363)
lom ... sar ... educ2 0.0846 (0.001)
qual2 0.1386 (0.000) educ3 0.1913 (0.000)
qual4 0.2636 (0.000) educ4 0.1833 (0.000)
qual5 0.4820 (0.000) educ5 0.2676 (0.000)
sect2 -0.0094 (0.823) sick 0.0011 (0.009)
sect3 0.0075 (0.873) mainjob -0.1422 (0.383)
sect4 -0.0807 (0.069) fsize2 0.0620 (0.004)
sect5 0.0559 (0.273) fsize3 0.1064 (0.000)
sect6 0.1061 (0.036) fsize4 0.1249 (0.000)
sect7 -0.0726 (0.165) fsize5 0.1374 (0.000)
sect8 -0.0991 (0.061) u_south  
fampos2 -0.0951 (0.000) u_north  
fampos3 -0.1195 (0.002) Constant 2.095 (0.000)
fampos4 -0.0081 (0.896)
use a feasible GLS (within/between) panel estimator,
3 which leads to the results listed in table
2. A concise description of the independent variables used in the analysis is reported in table 1.
Note that, since we consider the regional dimension as being crucial, we interact the individual
unemployment experience with North/South area dummies.
The results show that work experience is significantly associated to wage in a standard fash-
ion. Also higher qualifications and education levels are attached to higher earnings. The out-
comerelativetofirmsizeconfirmsprecedingempiricalevidence,thewageincreasingmonoton-
ically with firm size.
Thenovelresult,relevantforourmainaim,isthatindividualunemploymentexperiencestend
tobescarringonlyinthenorthernregions,whereaggregateunemploymentisrelativelylow. The
coefficient attached to previous individual unemployment spells of at least six months (-0.09)
is significant in the northern regions, and is not far from similar estimates for the UK (see e.g.
Arulampalam, 2001 and Gregory and Jukes, 2001). On the contrary, personal unemployment
experiences do not appear to be significantly associated with wages in the Southern regions
(where the coefficient is much lower in absolute value, -0.03).
In previous research we have already shown the smaller sensitivity of wages to unemploy-
ment in the southern regions, both in the short and in the long run (see e.g. Brunello HW DO,
2000, 2001a, 2001b). In those papers we have interpreted this evidence in terms of different
’’intra-national’’ institutions (as opposed to the conventional national institutions explanations),
with particular reference to local differences in the wage bargaining process. We think that an
additional explanation might emerge from this paper: indeed, we show that, FHWHULV SDULEXV,
￿
We leave the treatment of potential selection problems to later extensions to the present version of the paper.
5individual unemployment experience may be less important in determining wages in a social
environment characterized by high unemployment rates and in the presence of a less developed
productive structure. This interpretation is not far from ideas already present in Blanchard and
Summers (1988) that linked the absence of a natural rate of unemployment and the presence of
hysteresis also to the social behaviors that originate in the presence of diffuse unemployment
experiences.
 &RQFOXVLRQV
This paper investigates the effect of individual unemployment experiences on re-employment
wages. The empirical analysis is carried out on a panel of Italian individuals. The main result
is that while in the northern regions the effect is similar to the one estimated for the UK, in the
southern area of the country the impact is not significant. We link this result to the particular
socio-economic environment in which the unemployment spells are experienced. We argue that
thismightbeduetothefactthatinahighunemploymentenvironmentindividualunemployment
experiences are perceived as ’’normal’’ and do not necessarily signal poor quality of the worker.
Thismighthaveeffectsininducingthehysteresisofunemployment,andreducingthedownward
pressure of unemployment on wages at the macro level.
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